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This handout photograph released by Ukrainian Emergency Service on August 2, 2023 shows a view of a damaged building at a Ukrainian port on the Danube after a night drone attack in Odesa region, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities who released this image are not giving any more details on the precise location of the attack. Russian drones damaged infrastructure at a Ukrainian port on the Danube, as Moscow targeted strikes against facilities vital for grain shipments from Ukraine following the collapse of an export agreement. (Photo by Handout / UKRAINIAN EMERGENCY SERVICE / AFP)

When we discuss Ukraine’s recovery, one principle should be stated without hedging: Odesa matters. As Ukraine’s largest Black Sea city and the maritime heart of its export economy, Odesa will sit at the center of national reconstruction. Rebuilding it with modern logistics, resilient energy and world-class connectivity is not only Ukraine’s interest. It is Europe’s.

Yet here is the part rarely said aloud. A meaningful share of Odesa’s reconstruction will not begin in Odesa. It will begin some 300 kilometers to the southwest, in the Romanian cities of Constanța and Galați, where the cranes, the customs clearance and the project finance already exist inside the European Union. In practical terms, part of Ukraine’s recovery ecosystem will be built around Ukraine before it is fully built within it.

Geography is back, and it now has a price tag

Reconstruction is a physical business. The fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment issued jointly in February 2026 by the government of Ukraine, the World Bank, the European Commission and the United Nations, put Ukraine’s recovery needs at almost $588 billion over the coming decade, nearly three times the country’s projected 2025 GDP. Transport needs alone rose by around a quarter compared with the previous assessment, the direct result of intensified Russian strikes on rail and ports through 2025.

That is the strategic hinge most analyses miss. The corridor’s value does not rest on a calm sea. It rests on the opposite. Every time Russia targets Odesa’s port infrastructure, the case for redundant, EU-anchored staging capacity on the Lower Danube grows stronger. Resilience is not built in a single port. It is built in a network with more than one node, a logic Romania has been slow to articulate as policy and quick to apply as practice.

The Danube’s strategic comeback

A quiet lesson of this war is the rediscovery of a river. When the blockade disrupted deep-sea routes, the Danube became one of Ukraine’s most dependable lifelines, and modest ports such as Ukraine’s Reni and Izmail were reclassified overnight as infrastructure of European significance. The economics explain why. For grain, steel, fertilizer and heavy equipment, precisely what reconstruction moves in volume, inland waterway transport remains among the cheapest and most resilient options available. A barge does the work of hundreds of trucks, and it does not depend on a single contested shipping lane.

Constanța: the EU’s gateway into the war economy

If Odesa is Ukraine’s maritime heart, Constanța has become its European gateway. Romania’s largest port handled a record 92 million tons of total cargo in 2023 against a stated capacity above 100 million tons, with Ukrainian grain transiting the port reaching 14 million tons that year, close to 40 percent of Constanța’s own record grain total of 36 million tons. At the height of the 2022-23 emergency, Romania at one point carried roughly 80 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural exports through its multimodal routes, a figure that my co-author Cristian Chiscop and I set out in detail in our framework paper on the Romania-Moldova-Ukraine triangle for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Honesty requires a caveat that strengthens the thesis rather than weakening it. Once Ukraine reopened its own maritime corridor in late 2023, grain transiting Constanța fell back. But what the wartime spike proved is durable: Constanța can absorb Ukrainian volumes at scale, inside EU customs, regulatory and financial frameworks, with links to sea, rail, road and river. For an international contractor, that is the difference between an idea and an address, a nearby base offering legal certainty and logistical depth.

Constanța is increasingly becoming that address, and the investment now arriving confirms it is being treated as one. In April 2026, AD Ports Group of Abu Dhabi signed a framework agreement with Constanța’s port administration to explore joint investment and development, explicitly tying the port into its Middle Corridor strategy linking China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Abu Dhabi agreement does not commit capital outright, but Romanian-language industry sources reported in June 2026 that the wider Constanța development pipeline, principally the expansion of the Port of Constanța Sud-Agigea and the connecting motorways, already totals more than €2 billion ($2.3 billion) in committed and planned investment, with the port works alone expected to close around 2030.

Moldova’s quiet entry

A 2026 transaction made the integration explicit. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development sold its full stake in Danube Logistics, operator of Giurgiulești, Moldova’s only maritime-capable port and the route for over 70 percent of the country’s waterborne trade, to Romania’s state port company in Constanța. The deal, signed at the end of December 2025 and closed in April 2026, was valued at roughly $62 million, with at least a further $24-28 million committed to modernization. Giurgiulești now falls under the same administration as Constanța. Romania’s transport ministry framed the takeover as strategic infrastructure of regional and European significance, well placed to serve Ukraine’s future reconstruction.

What is emerging is no longer a loose cluster of ports. It is a vertically coordinated Lower Danube system spanning Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, the connectivity logic I argued for in my work with FES. The paper’s central argument was that Romania had relied for too long on point-management: useful improvisation in a crisis, such as the 2022 scramble that turned Constanța into Ukraine’s emergency grain outlet, but no substitute for a standing regional framework. The acquisition of Giurgiulești, alongside the broad-gauge line at Galați and the steady expansion of Constanța, is what that framework looks like once it stops being improvised.

The political architecture has caught up with the infrastructure. What began in 2022 as a ministerial-level consultation format between Romania, Moldova and Ukraine was upgraded in June 2025 to a first summit between the three heads of state in Odesa itself, and the format, now generally referred to as the Odesa Triangle, continued at foreign minister level into 2026, most recently on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. Energy security and regional connectivity sit on the agenda at every session. The triangle that gives this corridor its name is therefore not only a geographic description. It is also the name increasingly used for the diplomatic format that sits above it.

The pattern extends north as well as south. Romania’s newly approved €16.68 billion ($19 billion) financing package under the EU’s SAFE instrument, agreed in May 2026 and making Romania the second-largest beneficiary of the program after Poland, earmarks funds for dual-use transport infrastructure toward Moldova and Ukraine alongside its defense procurement programs. Combined with the long-discussed A8 motorway intended to link Odesa, Chișinău and Iași with Western Romania, the north of the country is positioning itself as a secondary corridor for reconstruction traffic towards Ukraine, complementing rather than competing with the Lower Danube triangle to the south.

Why investors should watch this triangle

Some corridors exist because governments decree them. Others exist because geography and necessity make them unavoidable. This one belongs to the second category. Black Sea access, Danube connectivity, a gauge frontier at Galați, EU customs and finance at Constanța, Moldovan integration at Giurgiulești, sovereign port investors now circling the Black Sea’s largest harbor, and a reconstruction bill approaching $588 billion together create a dynamic that will intensify, not fade.

This is why policymakers should treat the triangle as a single system, why financial institutions should prioritize the whole corridor rather than isolated assets, and why investors seeking durable exposure to Ukraine’s recovery should look here first.

Rebuilding Odesa will matter enormously. But building the Odesa-Constanța-Galați triangle, with the Lower Danube as its spine and the north of Romania as its hinterland, may prove equally transformative, not only for Ukraine’s recovery, but for the future economic geography of the entire Black Sea.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

Source: Opinion: Odesa Will Be Rebuilt, and the First Cranes May Turn on the Lower Danube

The Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) was co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine and took place in the city of Gdańsk on 25 and 26 June 2026.

URC 2026 seeks to bolster international support for the country’s reconstruction as well as catalyze investments for Ukrainian businesses.

The event focused on the sectors most impacted by Russian aggression: energy, critical infrastructure, and logistics.

The conference placed additional emphasis on enhancing Ukraine’s security capabilities, including a new Security and Defense dimension proposed by Poland, which was introduced as a new feature of URC 2026 in Gdansk. Strengthening Ukraine’s defense is viewed as essential for broader reconstruction and long-term development.

Designed as a high-impact investment facilitation platform, URC gathered international, sovereign and private capital actors to accelerate transactions and anchor long-term economic transformation.

URC 2026 brought together a diverse group of stakeholders, including heads of state and government, allied governments, national parliament members, international and financial institutions, business leaders, local authorities, and civil society organizations.

URC 2026 focused on five thematic dimensions:

1. Вusiness Dimension

Revitalizing Ukraine’s economy will require mobilizing both domestic and international private investment, supported by modern financial instruments such as war‑risk insurance. Continued alignment of the regulatory framework with EU standards will help ensure predictable conditions for business development, while a key priority will be transforming investment pipelines into transaction‑ready, bankable projects. Advancing privatization and well‑structured public‑private partnerships will further promote sustainable growth and accelerate recovery. Strengthening financial‑market solutions, expanding venture capital, and scaling up long‑term financing will be critical for driving innovation and rebuilding the country’s human capital. At the same time, expanding risk‑mitigation instruments – including guarantees, blended finance, and risk‑sharing tools – together with targeted support for companies in frontline regions will be essential to maintaining business activity in an environment of elevated risk.

Emphasis was placed on developing Ukraine’s processing and manufacturing industries, which are expected to serve as the backbone of the country’s future economic model by enabling higher value‑added production, export diversification, and greater economic resilience. Reconstruction efforts will also aim to promote sustainable business development by integrating environmental protection and climate‑resilient infrastructure into planning and implementation, with priority given to green recovery approaches, circular‑economy solutions, and alignment with EU environmental and climate standards.]

2. Human Dimension

Rebuilding Ukraine’s human capital requires a comprehensive social strategy encompassing children and youth, internally displaced persons, improved education, healthcare (including rehabilitation, prosthetics, and mental health), and veteran reintegration systems. All these elements need to function in concert and maintain flexibility, enabling rapid responses to evolving social structures and labor‑market requirements. Investments in rehabilitation and social cohesion are key to restoring well-being and rebuilding the social fabric. URC also drove conversations about how to engage Ukrainians who were forced by Russia’s full-scale war to flee the country in the search of safety as well as the Ukrainian diaspora in supporting demographic and economic recovery. In this context, the human dimension also sought to highlight the importance of diaspora involvement in the questions of Ukraine’s sustainable recovery. Finally, URC aimed to strengthen cultural connections between Ukrainian and European societies, as well as foster partnerships for the protection of national heritage, which are essential for advancing Ukraine’s recovery and supporting its integration with the European Union. These priorities informed broader discussions on adapting Ukraine’s economic model to new demographic and social realities.

3. Local and Regional Dimension

Local and regional governments are central to Ukraine’s reconstruction, and the URC 2026 emphasized building resilient communities through sustainable urban and rural development, modernized housing, decentralized energy systems, and strengthened local economies. This effort drew on partners’ expertise in governance and reconstruction, while also fostering cooperation agreements between Ukrainian municipalities and their international counterparts. Attention was directed toward communities that require substantial capacity building and material support. Moreover, within this dimension, discussions highlighted the importance of a comprehensive and integrated approach to reconstruction, ensuring that policies on housing, transport connectivity, regional and local development are coherent and mutually reinforcing. As part of the local‑governance track, Poland and Ukraine intend to establish a joint platform facilitating direct communication among municipalities. This mechanism will accelerate the exchange of information, best practices, and crisis‑response coordination. By leveraging Poland’s experience in community development and its past EU‑accession challenges – many of which parallel Ukraine’s current transformation – the platform aims to help Ukraine expedite reconstruction by adopting proven, effective solutions.

4. EU Dimension

EU accession is a crucial pathway for Ukraine. URC 2026 will facilitate discussions on accession reforms, economic integration with the EU, the importance of stable political institutions, rule of law, judicial reform, human rights, and effective public service. The EU dimension will also enable constructive dialogue on the progress of the Ukraine Plan and activities enabled by the Ukraine Facility.

5. Security and Defense Dimension

Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity is not only essential for its security but will also drive the recovery and economic growth. Priority topics will include air defense, intelligence coordination and unmanned technologies as well as military mobility. Protection of civilian infrastructure, particularly energy and industrial capacity, will also be discussed. Dedicated attention was given to humanitarian demining of contaminated territories of Ukraine, as well as to further strengthening the national system for the development and governance of a network of civilian shelters drawing on the experience acquired by Ukraine. Moreover, the Security Dimension covered broader resilience topics critical for both Ukraine and the EU such as national resistance as part of the total defense doctrine, dual-use and AI technologies, as well as countering disinformation. URC 2026 promoted international defense cooperation, defense-industrial partnerships, and technological support. URC 2026 also fostered investment and cooperation opportunities between Ukrainian and Polish military industrial bases, particularly in bordering regions. The conference also highlighted the experience Ukrainians bring to the Euro-Atlantic security infrastructure and the value of their expertise in military technology, defense reform process, and strategy.

Integral parts of URC 2026:

• Recovery Forum – an interactive in-person platform for Ukrainian, Polish, and international stakeholders to engage in open dialogue, share best practices, build partnerships, and explore solutions for private-sector involvement in reconstruction. Workshops covered a wide range of practical topics to be discussed at the expert level, which are essential for advancing Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, and investment attraction.
• Business Fair – featuring presentations and exhibits by Ukrainian, Polish, and international companies, fostering cooperation among local authorities, businesses of all sizes, and investors, and creating new opportunities for innovation and sustainable economic growth.
• The Infrastructure Platform – operated alongside all URC 2026 dimensions. It was structured around four pillars: 1) transport connectivity, focusing on restoring and modernizing roads, railways, ports, and future airports for integration into the TEN-T network;
  2) energy resilience, emphasizing distributed generation, energy efficiency, and integration into ENTSO-e;
  3) digital transformation implementing smart technologies for infrastructure management and transparent recovery;
  4) progressive alignment of Ukraine’s transport, energy, border, and customs regulations with EU standards. Within the Infrastructure Platform, discussions also addressed the role and investment needs of Ukraine and EU Member States in transport and energy infrastructure to strengthen Ukraine’s economic resilience, revitalize strategic trade potential, and improve defense.
• The Energy Platform – operated as a dedicated high-level dialogue bringing together governments, international financial institutions, energy companies, and investors to discuss the transformation of Ukraine’s energy sector under wartime conditions and its integration into the European energy system. The Platform focused on four interconnected pillars: 1) energy resilience and security; 2) Ukraine’s new Energy Strategy; 3) state and private sector cooperation in building a new decentralized energy system; 4) investment mobilization and market development. Within the Energy Platform, the role of Ukraine and its international partners in strengthening regional energy security and advancing Ukraine’s integration into European energy was addressed.
• Steering Committee and the Ministerial meeting of the Ukraine Donor Platform – as usual, the Ukraine Donor Platform held high-level discussions in the margins of the URC, bringing together representatives of the Government of Ukraine, G7 members, the European Union, international financial institutions, and key partner countries. The Steering Committee meeting focused on key priorities including securing Ukraine’s budget financing needs; driving reforms, including Public Investment Management reform; strengthening Ukraine’s resilience and recovery efforts; enhancing Ukraine’s energy security; and scaling private investment and private sector engagement. The Ministerial Meeting provided political guidance for the further work of the Ukraine Donor Platform, reinforced alignment among international partners and implementing actors, and reaffirmed the long-term international commitment to Ukraine’s sustainable recovery, resilience, and European integration.
• The Think-Tank Forum was planned as a dedicated side event providing a platform for engaging diverse analytical expertise in discussions on Ukraine’s recovery. It convened a broad range of research institutions to contribute evidence-based insights, support strategic dialogue, and inform policy approaches across key areas of reconstruction and long-term development.

Source: https://www.urc-international.com/

A Turkish waste management leader warns reconstruction must prioritize demining and toxic waste control, or recovery risks becoming an environmental disaster.

As reported by the online media Ukrinform.

The rebuilding of Ukraine will unfold under a new paradigm – not just restoration, but effectively creating a country from scratch; ecological restoration will become its key element.

According to Ali Riza Onar, head of the Turkish Association for Waste Management and Waste-to-Energy Producers (TAYED), such a perspective underscores the role of ecology in future recovery.

Key Stages of Ecological Restoration

What is happening in Ukraine is not a classical reconstruction, but effectively the creation of a country anew. Therefore, at the first stage it is vital to correctly define ecological priorities. I view this process in five key directions

– Ali Riza Onar

First, ensuring territorial safety: without clearing mines, unexploded ordnance, and dangerous chemical residues, no infrastructure projects can develop properly.

Second, managing ruins and military waste: among the waste – not only concrete and metal – there are toxic substances, fuel residues, and asbestos. Uncontrolled handling of such waste could lead to a new environmental catastrophe.

Third, restoring systems of clean water and sewerage, as drinking water is critically important for public health.

Fourth, assessing and mapping contamination levels of soils and waters, because without precise data it is impossible to find the right solutions.

Fifth and most importantly: Ukraine should not simply reproduce the old system but build a new one – modern, ecological, and aligned with European standards.

The expert stressed the readiness of Turkish companies to share experience, as well as participate in restoration projects.

Turkey’s experience in infrastructure, waste management, municipal systems, and rapid on-site project deployment is a major advantage. They can actively collaborate with Ukrainian companies and international financial-technology structures

– Turkish expert

He assured that Turkey would act not only as an executor but as a partner offering solutions.

Thus, Ukraine’s partnership with Turkey in the field of ecological restoration could become a foundation for the country’s sustainable development and ensure a safe future for its population.

Source: https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/ac92a1b5_turkish_firms_pledge/

Kredobank is the Ukrainian subsidiary of Poland’s largest bank, PKO Bank Polski. The financial institution handles 15% of the financial flows associated with trade between Ukraine and Poland. Furthermore, the bank is one of the most active lenders to businesses in Ukraine, ranking 14th out of 58 Ukrainian banks in terms of loan volumes extended to corporate clients. Since 2024, Kredobank has also been providing financing under the Ukraine Facility.

LIGA.net I spoke with Yaroslav Beldovskyi, First Deputy Chairman of the Management Board of Kredobank, about the criteria a company must meet to obtain financing from Kredobank, how the institution finances the energy sector, and the results of business lending in frontline regions.

Read the full article: https://finance.liga.net/en/bank/interview/300-million-in-loans-and-the-ukraine-facility-who-is-being-financed-in-ukraine-by-the-subsidiary-of-polands-largest-bank

Palantir is often considered controversial for bringing private AI close to war and state power. In Ukraine, it has found its clearest argument: software that can help a democracy survive a larger invading army.

Technology is moving faster than many systems meant to regulate it. In Ukraine, the pace is even more intense. The battlefield has become an R&D environment for future warfare, where new tools are tested, adapted, destroyed, improved, and sent back into use at wartime speed. That feedback loop is accelerating military innovation, and one of the companies most closely tied to that process is the American AI software firm Palantir.

Sitting down with UNITED24 Media, Palantir CEO Alex Karp talks about Ukraine, AI warfare, and why the country has become the company’s biggest test.

What’s a Palantir?

Palantir builds software that helps governments, militaries, and companies make sense of huge amounts of fragmented data. In Ukraine, its AI tools are used by the military to support battlefield analysis, target acquisition, and faster decision-making. The company’s role is to turn scattered information into something that states and institutions can act on quickly.

Palantir was among the first major American technology companies to move openly toward Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In 2022, Karp traveled to Kyiv, met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and offered the company’s AI and data software to support Ukraine’s defense.

“When I came four years ago, there was a general sense of, wow, we have a daunting task,” says Karp. What impressed him most, he added, was Ukrainians’ willingness to fight and sacrifice for their country’s survival.

That cooperation continued on May 12, 2026, when Zelenskyy met Karp again and said the two sides discussed areas where Ukraine and Palantir could strengthen the defense of Ukraine, the US, and its partners. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said Ukraine also presented its defense-tech priorities, including AI-enabled Shahed detection and interception, faster command systems, combat data analysis, target detection, and mission planning.

Since then, Palantir’s role has expanded throughout the Ukrainian government. The company has worked with Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, signed a partnership with the Ministry of Economy, and in 2026 joined the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the Defense Intelligence Research Institute. 

The controversy

Karp does not dispute that Palantir works in some of the most politically controversial areas of modern technology. “We’re involved in almost every conflict in the world,” he said, adding that some people dislike both its military role and its commercial success. But in Ukraine, he frames the company as a supporting actor.

We support war fighters and heroes. We get to bask in essentially the part of the glory that’s downstream from you guys winning. 

Alex Karp

CEO Palantir Technologies

For Karp, the relationship with Ukraine is also personal. “I kind of like being in a place where people like us,” he told us, adding that in Ukraine, “people see me here and they smile.” 

In many Western democracies, the company is often treated less like a normal software firm and more like a political bogeyman: a private intelligence-and-AI giant embedded in military targeting, policing, immigration enforcement, healthcare data, and other sensitive state systems. Its critics warn that Palantir operates too close to government power, with too little public understanding of what its tools actually do.

Palantir is controversial because its AI and influence are deployed right where power is exercised, raising serious long-term implications. Ukraine demonstrates the company’s short-term relevance. The country lacked the luxury of time during Russia’s 2022 invasion; after resisting the initial assault, the Ukrainian Armed Forces realized they would have to fight asymmetrically, leveraging technology to defeat a numerically superior adversary.

Derugulation and testing

Ukraine’s defense industry was born and fast-tracked through short-term thinking, deregulation, and an open door to companies outside the traditional defense-prime procurement system. The result was a wartime model with turnarounds measured in weeks, not years.

In Karp’s view, Ukraine’s achievement is not simply that it adopted foreign technology, but that Ukrainian teams made it useful under war conditions. He described this as “the new notion of fighting wars” where Ukraine links units, drones, and data into one fast battlefield system.

That system is valuable because it learns quickly. Soldiers test equipment at the front. Units report what works. Engineers adjust the tools. The next version goes back into use. Karp called this feedback loop “one of, if not the best, I’ve ever seen.”

Ukrainians are excavating things we built, making them much more useful. They do it on the battlefield with a small number of people, then show the world how these things work in both government and commercial contexts.

Alex Karp

CEO Palantir Technologies

For Karp, battlefield AI only matters if it is connected to real data, real units, and real decisions. “You can’t just take a model and run it against complicated AI infrastructures,” he said. The system has to show “who sees it under what context,” and still give humans the ability “up to the last moment to pull the plug.”

For Ukraine, data has become hard power. Drone footage, radar tracks, strike reports, and air defense data are now used to train the next generation of military systems across the world. In January 2026, Ukraine launched Brave1 Dataroom with Palantir and defense institutions, creating a secure space for Ukrainian companies to train and test AI models on real battlefield data.

Ukrainian officials said they are aiming for 100% identification of aerial targets, at least 95% interception rates, and expanded use of AI to counter airborne threats and gain an advantage in the air, with a broader strategic goal of gaining air superiority and transferring part of the combat operations onto Russian territory.

Russia is attacking Ukraine with missiles, Shaheds, glide bombs, artillery, manpower, and drones. In some frontline cities, Russian FPVs now roam almost freely, intentionally hunting civilians. Ukraine cannot beat Russia by size alone, so it has to fight asymmetrically, and technology is the greatest force multiplier in this war.

Battlefield data is Ukraine’s strength

Karp has previously claimed that Palantir is responsible for “most of the targeting in Ukraine,” but in the interview, he was more cautious. He said Ukraine has built “among the most important, easy to use, interactive and adaptive targeting systems in the world,” with Palantir playing a major but partial role: “Parts of that system are us, but a large part was built by them [Ukrainians].”

Ukraine’s strength, Karp argues, comes from the mix of technical talent, battlefield pressure, and national will. “You need to build a small team of technically talented people who are mission-driven, who are believers, and who are fighting for their lives,” he said. That helped Ukraine move from expected defeat to a belief in victory.

Ukraine’s success is also drawing a lot of attention abroad. Brave1 Dataroom gives Ukrainian defense companies access to real battlefield data so they can train and test AI tools against Russian aerial threats. Ukraine is also beginning to share parts of that data with allies, with Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov calling it “unmatched anywhere else in the world.”

Ukraine’s battlefield data is incredibly valuable because it comes from real combat at a high human cost. The lessons learned by Ukrainian soldiers are now helping to build better air defenses, smarter drones, and more powerful AI. However, critics would argue that Ukraine must also ensure that it keeps control over this data and the technology it helps create.

“It is very important for moral imperatives to win,” Karp says, however, adding that Ukraine shows that moral arguments are not enough on their own when it comes to survival, and where the lines are not always as clear.

Does a world order exist where you can’t defend yourself? Or is the world order strong enough to protect you, where you, the sovereign nation, don’t have the means to defend yourself against larger, more entrenched powers? The obvious answer is no.

Alex Karp

CEO Palantir Technologies

Ukraine is the test of Palantir’s vision of modern war, a modern democracy using advanced technology to defend itself against a larger invading army, waging a devastating, illegal war. In other advanced democracies, critics will rightfully keep asking how much power private AI firms should have inside state security systems. For Ukraine, the question often is more immediate: does the software help find a target, stop a drone, clear a mine, or save a city? If so, we’ll take it.

Source: https://united24media.com/interview/palantirs-ai-vision-meets-its-strongest-test-in-ukraine-interview-with-ceo-alex-karp-18727

American billionaire and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, together with his wife Wendy Schmidt, have joined the group of co-owners of several commercial real estate assets belonging to investment group Dragon Capital. The relevant changes in the ownership structure appeared in state registers in late May and early June.

According to YouControl data, the couple each acquired 36% in seven group companies that own several major real estate properties in Kyiv, including the Eurasia and Prime business centers, the Piramida shopping and business center, as well as the East Gate Logistic complex.

The transaction was structured through the Cyprus-based company New Ukraine PE Holding Limited, which owns the relevant Ukrainian assets. Following the ownership restructuring, around 22% of the holding remains with the family trust of Dragon Capital founder Tomas Fiala.

According to estimates by Forbes Ukraine analysts, the value of the stake acquired by the Schmidt family may range from $55 million to $70 million.

Despite the entry of new shareholders, Dragon Capital will continue to manage the assets. Market participants note that such a model makes it possible to attract additional capital, retain control over the properties, and at the same time reduce investment risks.

The portfolio included in the transaction consists of assets showing positive financial performance dynamics. Revenue at the 33,400 sq. m Eurasia business center increased by 24% in 2025, reaching UAH 194 million. The Prime business center grew revenue by 11%, to nearly UAH 95 million.

The Piramida shopping and business center, with an area of over 26,000 sq. m and more than 100 tenants, generated around UAH 463 million in revenue for its owners, up 11% year-on-year. The East Gate Logistic complex, with an area of around 50,000 sq. m, increased revenue by more than 10%, to UAH 138.8 million. Property Management Services, which manages the group’s real estate assets, increased revenue by 9.5%, to nearly UAH 24 million.

Experts link the interest of the American investor to the long-term prospects of the Ukrainian real estate market. In their view, foreign investors are considering the acquisition of quality commercial assets at valuations below pre-war levels, expecting significant capital appreciation after the situation in the country stabilizes and the economy recovers.

The transaction also reflects a gradual revival of investment activity in Ukraine’s real estate market. According to consulting firms, in 2025 the volume of office real estate transactions increased 2.5 times to $87 million, while investment in shopping centers rose by 35% to $81 million.

For Eric Schmidt, this is not his first investment project in Ukraine. In recent years, the entrepreneur has actively supported Ukrainian technology and defense initiatives. In particular, he participated in the creation of drone manufacturer White Stork and also cooperated with the Ukrainian side in the development and supply of advanced drones.

The appearance of one of the best-known figures in American technology business among investors in Dragon Capital’s assets is viewed by market participants as a positive signal for international capital and further confirmation of the investment attractiveness of Ukrainian assets even amid the ongoing war.

Source: https://inventure.com.ua/en/news/ukraine/former-google-ceo-and-his-wife-invest-up-to-dollar70-million-in-kyiv-commercial-real-estate

EU member states are currently debating the allocation of $7.6 billion in funding from the European Peace Facility that was recently unblocked following a shift in Hungary’s policy.

While Germany, the fund’s largest contributor, is advocating for these resources to be directed entirely toward Ukraine, Poland is insisting that a portion of the funds be used to reimburse member states for the military equipment they have already supplied, according to Babel on June 10.

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The European Peace Facility is an off-budget mechanism intended to finance defense initiatives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the fund has been used to partially reimburse countries for weapons transferred to Kyiv.

In total, member states have spent $49.5 billion on such efforts, with Brussels theoretically obligated to reimburse $15.5 billion. However, the treasury currently holds only $7.6 billion.

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas has proposed a distribution plan for these funds. Under her proposal, 10% would be allocated to reimburse member states for past weapons purchases, while the remaining 90% would be dedicated to supporting the training of Ukrainian forces and procuring new equipment for Ukraine.

Poland has rejected this plan. Cezary Tomczyk, Poland’s deputy defense minister, stated that Warsaw intends to “fight for every euro” and is seeking approximately $517.5 million in reimbursements for the equipment it has already provided to Ukraine.

Warsaw has characterized the current proposal from Brussels as an attempt to “change the rules of the game in the middle of the game,” a position currently supported by Slovakia.

In contrast, Germany is calling for the entirety of the unblocked funds to be transferred directly to Ukraine rather than returned to national budgets. Sebastian Hartmann, Germany’s deputy defense minister, expressed this position during a meeting of EU defense ministers in Nicosia.

Germany’s view is shared by several Scandinavian countries. France has generally aligned with the proposal from Kaja Kallas, partly because the smaller scale of French contributions means the country expects lower reimbursement amounts. France’s primary condition remains that any equipment purchased with these funds must be of European origin.

The government of Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar officially ended a two-year blockade on the European Peace Facility, which unlocked $7.68 billion in immediate funding to compensate EU member states for weapons supplied to Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

This decision marked a fundamental pivot in Budapest’s foreign policy, as the previous administration had used the requirement for unanimous consent to stall the fund, which had led to a significant backlog in pending reimbursements.

Source: https://united24media.com/world/poland-and-germany-divided-on-how-to-use-unblocked-76b-eu-ukraine-fund-19719

In July–May of the 2025–2026 marketing year, Spain became the top buyer of Ukrainian sunflower oil, surpassing India. Thus, the Spanish market became a key export destination for one of Ukraine’s main agricultural products during that period.

During this period, Ukraine exported 578,500 tons of sunflower oil to Spain, accounting for 14.5% of total exports.

India ranked second with 571,500 tons and a 14.3% share.

“During April–May, Spain imported an additional 132,800 tons of Ukrainian sunflower oil, while India imported 87,100 tons,” the publication states. — “This allowed Spanish buyers to take first place among export destinations.”

The Netherlands remains in third place in terms of Ukrainian sunflower oil imports, having imported 460,200 tons of this product from April to May. The top five also included Italy (407,900 tons) and France (233,000 tons).

As reported, in January-April 2026, compared to January-April 2025, egg exports increased by 22% to 785.2 million units, and in monetary terms, by 72% to $88.6 million.

The main buyers of Ukrainian eggs in January–April 2026 were Spain (27.4%), the United Kingdom (14.2%), Poland (10.6%), and Israel (7.7%). The share of EU countries in exports is 74%.

In 2025, Ukrainian egg producers increased exports by 65.6% compared to 2024, reaching 2.05 billion units. During this period, egg exports in monetary terms grew 2.8-fold to $201.9 million.

Spain was also the main importer of Ukrainian eggs in 2025 (16.4%), followed by the United Kingdom (11.9%) in second place and the Czech Republic (10.3%) in third.

This is reported by latifundist.com, citing information from the Ministry of Economy.

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Souce: https://ua.news/en/money/ispaniia-stala-naibilshim-importerom-ukrayinskoyi-soniashnikovoyi-oliyi