Sectoral reforms, human capital and tax policies: what to expect in the next four years

In the first article, we considered the institutional reforms foreseen by several strategic documents which the Ukrainian government promised to implement over the next few years: EU-2023 Review, Ukraine Facility Plan, IMF program for Ukraine, and the government Revenue Strategy.

In this article, we look at sectoral reforms that should create prerequisites for sustainable economic development and EU integration. We also discuss planned changes in the taxation system that should increase budget revenues. Overall the proposed measures (if implemented properly) will result in more efficient spending of public funds and will improve the investment attractiveness of Ukraine.

Human capital: improvements in education and care for the vulnerable 

The current IMF program focuses on macroeconomic stability and sustainability of public finance and therefore it only briefly mentions human capital (previous programs usually also included only general references to healthcare or education reforms). Specifically, the IMF program states that the Ukrainian government will refrain from introducing new “special” (privileged) pensions or lowering pension age since the Ukrainian pension system is already strained. EU documents do not mention healthcare reform either, perhaps implying that healthcare reform launched in 2017 should continue (at the same time EU-2023 Review notes that the absence of a national health insurance card does not allow implementation of the European Health Insurance Card in Ukraine). The Ukraine Facility Plan includes investment in healthcare (see Table 2) but no institutional reforms. It pays a lot of attention to education and social security: these spheres are essential to preserve and develop Ukraine’s human capital. 

The government will continue consolidating social payments (recently it adopted a decree on the Single System for Social Sphere that will keep the data of all the recipients of social support). The creation of this single database has been ongoing for over 15 years, and now it is supported by another World Bank loan. The need to change the model of social support has been discussed for years, but recently the government made a few practical steps to replace “the zoo” of social payments with tailored support for households. The aim of this new system is to address specific needs of a household (restore lost documents, find a job, enroll children into a school etc.) so that it becomes sustainable. Social services will be provided not only by state and communal entities but also by private organizations or NGOs.

A comprehensive law on the integration of veterans into civilian life (to be adopted) will address healthcare needs, retraining, employment, and support for veteran businesses. Ukraine plans to develop an electronic system with information on all the people with disabilities that will use the International Classification of Functioning Disability and Health. The system will automatically offer support to these people.

Both EU-2023 Review and Ukraine Facility foresee de-institutionalization of elderly, people with disabilities, and children. The former two groups will get tailored social services and the latter one – foster families.

The major reforms of the housing policy foresee the adoption of legislation to enable leases with an opportunity to buy communal housing, to improve the transparency of the distribution of social housing and opportunities for civil society organizations (CSOs) to monitor social housing projects. The standards for social housing such as accessibility, energy efficiency etc. will be adopted (in fact, they will be introduced for all the housing – see Table 3).

EU-2023 Review notes that Ukraine still has to do some work on eliminating discrimination: to implement the equal rights strategy and gender pay gap strategy, to ratify the ILO convention 190 on reducing violence and harassment. Ukraine also needs to start collecting relevant data, e.g. statistics on court cases on discrimination, to be able to measure progress in this sphere. 

Ukraine’s EU integration includes integration of the labour markets. Thus Ukraine will need to provide for EU citizens and their children the same rights to access employment and education as Ukrainian citizens have. Recently, the legislation for employment of foreigners was simplified (the wage floor was abandoned) but they still need an employment permit. Ukraine recognizes foreign qualifications since 2021 but it still needs to implement the EU law on professional recognition in full and to join the EURES network which supports the EU single labour market. Simplification of employment for foreigners will be beneficial for Ukraine because it currently faces labour shortages in some industries.

Another EU requirement is better protection of the rights of workers: strengthening social dialogue and powers of the respective Council, aligning workplace safety norms with the EU and providing more powers to labour inspections (implementation of ILO Conventions 81 and 129 which Ukraine ratified a long time ago).

Ukraine Facility Plan foresees adoption of the new laws on vocational and pre-school education. Two draft laws on vocational education (42074207-1) that were submitted to the parliament in 2020 were rejected by the parliamentary committee on education in August 2023. In April 2024 the Ministry of Education presented another draft law on this topic (currently under discussion). The ministry plans to intensify cooperation between vocational schools and potential employers and to provide new equipment to vocational schools. The draft law on preschool education was adopted in the first reading more than a year ago. This new legislation on vocational and preschool education should establish fair market rules and a “guaranteed” access to preschool education for all the children of relevant age. 

Speaking of other education levels, the EU-2023 review mentions implementation of the Strategy on higher education adopted at the end of 2022. The strategy foresees mergers of higher education institutions to exploit economies of scale and development of the “money follows a student” principle: provision of educational grants to students instead of “budget-funded places” for the majority of specialties.

Although Ukraine has very little money to invest into science and research, it cooperates with the Horizon Europe program; it also adopted the National Open Science Plan and Strategy for Innovation Sector development. Today this sphere is probably the least reformed. The Ministry of Education and Science plans to introduce performance-based research funding, the first steps to which were made in 2018 when the National Research Fund was created.

Table 1. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the sphere of human capital

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the Demographic Development Strategy for the period up to 2040 (done)Q3 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a strategy to deinstitutionalize elderly and people with disabilities Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a strategy to deinstitutionalize children Q4 2024
EU-2023Develop and implement a strategy to attract and reintegrate displaced persons in the Ukrainian labour market2024
EU-2023Establish national office and contact points for the Horizon Europe program2024
EU-2023Adopt the strategy for scientific and technological development2024
EU-2023Develop regional smart specialization strategies2024
EU-2023Develop a plan for a relevant statistical data collection, analysis and sharing mechanism for education and training2024
EU-2023Implement a plan to optimize the network of education institutions2024
Ukraine FacilityAdopt the strategy for developing culture (enhancing cultural institutions and support for creative industries)Q1 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityImplement the law on preschool educationQ1 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityImplement the law on vocational educationQ2 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt Cabmin resolution on the procurement of social services Q2 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt legislation on the transition system from military service to civilian lifeQ4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a law on key priorities of housing policy Q4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt Population Employment StrategyQ2 2026
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a new version of the law on social housing fundQ4 2026
Ukraine FacilityAdopt a law introducing electronic system for people with disabilities and offering relevant support to themQ4 2026

Table 2. Investment in human capital foreseen by Ukraine Facility program (at least 20% to be allocated by local governments)

investment purposeamount, EUR million
2024-20252026-2027
School shelters, school buses, modern teaching methods + equipment for them; materials and equipment, nutrition, VET centres at schools300350
Healthcare: lab equipment, shelters, medical equipment, healthcare infrastructure, IT solutions 200200
Reconstruction of damaged and construction of new social infrastructure350
Compensation to people whose houses were destroyed600
Provision of housing to persons with disabilities of I-II groups; to IDPs who fought for Ukraine and their family members; to family members of deceased defenders200250

Energy market and green transition: more market elements, less government regulation

Measures in this sector (among them market pricing of energy and enhancing competition) aim to raise energy efficiency and thus lower consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They include alignment of Ukrainian legislation with EU directives on electricity and gas markets and on atomic energy; introduction of market-based carbon pricing mechanisms and a different carbon tax model; development of more efficient (decentralized) district heating (table 3). Ukraine should adopt an Energy and Climate plan that would set a more ambitious goal than the current 27% of energy supplied by renewable sources by 2030 (in 2021 this share was about 6%).

These changes will be accompanied by investment in energy infrastructure and energy efficiency (table 4).

Unfortunately, the introduction of market energy tariffs is delayed until martial law is lifted. This will impede capital investment in the sector and will likely worsen the financial situation of Naftogas. Recent Russian attacks on energy generation mean that Ukraine has to urgently rebuild power generation capacities. Since the end of the war is not insight, it is better to aim at distributed power generation – small power stations that use gas, oil products or bio materials that are easy to protect. Construction of large generation capacities, such as nuclear reactors, should be postponed. 

Table 3. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the sphere of energy and green transition

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended or other indicatorsdeadline
IMFCalculate the stock of arrears of District Heating companies to Naftogas (distribute by pre- and after full-scale war)Structural benchmarkQ2 2024 (end-June)
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt energy and climate plan (draftQ2 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the Strategy for thermal modernization of buildings (done)Q2 2024
Ukraine FacilityNEURC adopts secondary legislation for REMIT law to ensure integrity and transparency of wholesale energy marketQ3 2024
IMFCompensations to Naftogas for its PSO duties shall not exceed UAH 60 bn (end-Aug – compensation sum calculated)Q3 2024
IMFAdopt draft law 6133 to accommodate for the end of gas transit 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAmend the Cabmin decree to encourage investment into green energy (implement the EU Directive 2018/2001). The guarantees of renewable energy sources were introduced in 2023.Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law providing more independence to NEURC in line with EU (exempt the decisions of the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission from the state registration procedure)Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law providing more independence to NEURC in line with EU legislation (special status of NEURC)Q4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityApprove action plan (measures and time frame) for establishment of GHG emissions trading systemQ1 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law on climate policy setting climate goals and mechanisms for their achievementQ1 2025
Revenue strategyDevelop GHG emissions taxation model that would tax oil, gas, coal extraction or imports rather than GHG emissions2024-2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a Roadmap to separate the Renewable Energy Surcharge from the Transmission Tariff Q2 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityResume mandatory monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system for emitting facilities according to existing legislation (i.e. only newly built facilities)Q2 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the new law on district heating (setting clear rules for connection and disconnection; procedures for installment of individual heat substations)Q3 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement (current commitment is reduction of emissions by 2030 to 65% of 1990 level – practically achieved)Q3 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityCancel the moratorium on raising heat and hot water tariffsQ4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a new law on electricity market introducing 16 EU directivesQ4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAppoint a nominated electricity market operator designated by National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC).Q4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the State targeted economic program for energy modernisation of heat generating enterprises until 2030 Q4 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityCreate an independent Scientific and Expert Council on Climate Change and Preservation of the Ozone LayerQ4 2025
Ukraine FacilityImplement EU Directive 2022/03/MC–EnС to align with the EU taxation and customs regimes for cross-border electricity trade Q2 2026
EU-2023, Ukraine Facility, IMFAdopt a Roadmap for gradual liberalization of gas and electricity markets to be implemented after the expiration of the martial law (liberalization of prices, reform of PSO, introduction of targeted subsidies)Q2 2026
Ukraine FacilityAdopt a law streamlining permit issuance for green investment in line with EU rulesQ3 2026
Ukraine FacilityAdopt minimum requirements for energy efficiency and classes of energy efficiency of buildingsQ3 2026
Ukraine FacilityAdopt requirements to energy labeling and eco-design as mandatory minimum criteria during public procurement. Strengthen the capacity of the state market surveillance body to enforce these requirements.Q1 2027

Table 4. Investment into energy sector foreseen by Ukraine Facility program

investment purposeamount, EUR million
2026-2027
Raising energy efficiency of district heating companies550
Contribution to the Energy Efficiency Fund 
Thermal modernisation of public buildings
Physical protection of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure
Support for the development of renewable energy sources

Environmental protection: improving quality of land and water, protecting biodiversity and forests

In this sphere, like in all the others, Ukraine should work on aligning its legislation with the EU acquis, specifically, introduce the EU air and water quality standards and relevant measurement system; adopt and implement the draft law on emerald network (a number of nature preservation sites). Automated pollution control systems should be installed at all the facilities, not only the new plants, because the largest pollutants are the old Soviet legacy plants. Ukraine will need to amend its legislation to align with the UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents which Ukraine ratified in 2022. Specifically, Ukraine will need to establish closer cooperation between the State Emergency Service and State Ecological Inspection to develop prevention measures to mitigate environmental risks resulting from industrial accidents. 

Table 5. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the sphere of environmental protection

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law on ensuring the rights to a safe environment (introducing EU Directive 2010/75/EU). Adopt necessary by-laws by Q3 2025 including provisions on applications of the best available technologies.Q3 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityDevelop a concept note defining the scope of deviations from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) rulesQ3 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the Strategy for implementing the principles of the circular economy and its Action Plan in 5-10 priority sectors (e.g. waste, textiles, electronics, agriculture)Q1 2026
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityApprove national waste management plan until 2033 (current plan until 2030 is not implemented yet)Q1 2026
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the law on reducing deforestation and forest degradation: expand electronic timber accounting, introduce certification of origin of timber and wood productsQ2 2026

Agricultural sector: more transparency of state support and demining

The main expected changes in the agricultural sector are (1) introduction of land monitoring systems and (2) supporting only farmers who are registered in the State Agrarian Registry. Ukraine Facility foresees provision to Ukrainian farmers of EUR 75 million in 2024-2025 and the same amount in 2026-2027 for demining.

Table 6. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the agrifood sector

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt demining strategy until 2033 (draft approved in Feb 2024)Q2 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt national strategy on agriculture and rural development for 2023-2030 (concept)Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law on state agrarian registry (SAR)(at the end of Q1 2026 at least 80% of public support to agricultural producers should be provided via SAR)Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt a long-term plan for the development of irrigation systemsQ1 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityDeploy the automated system for monitoring of land relations and the geoinformation system for land assessment within State Land Cadaster in line with the decree on public land monitoringQ1 2025
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the new version of the law on state support to agro producersQ3 2025
Ukraine FacilityDeploy the EU-aligned Farm Sustainability Data Network (FSDN) systemQ1 2027

Transport: reforms of the border crossing points, railroads, and water transport

In this sector, a lot of changes are planned for all the modes of transport. On the railways, the European model will be introduced (the discussion of different models of railroad restructuring can be found at VoxUkraine: article 1article 2). Western border crossing points will be developed, and regulation of maritime and river transport will be considerably changed in line with the EU rules. Ukraine Facility foresees investment of EUR 350 million in 2026-2027 into reconstruction of transport infrastructure.

Table 7. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the transport sector

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the revised transport strategy until 2030Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the Strategy for developing and expanding the border infrastructure with EU and Moldova until 2030Q4 2024
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the law on aligning Ukraine railways with EU acquisQ4 2025
Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law on better regulation of maritime and river shipping and simplification of administrative proceduresQ2 2026
EU-2023, Ukraine FacilityAdopt the EU regulation on port servicesQ1 2027

Critical materials

Ukraine has many materials that will be useful for years to come, e.g. lithium, rare earth metals, and non-metal materials. The Ukrainian government plans to attract investors into extraction of these materials via product sharing agreements or PPPs.

Table 8. Documents and other indicators of reforms in the sector of critical materials

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
Ukraine FacilityAdopt the draft law on mineral base developmentQ4 2024
Ukraine FacilityUpgrade the e-cabinet of subsoil usersQ1 2025
Ukraine FacilityLaunch the Product Sharing Agreement (PSA) tenders with participation of international players; publish the resultsQ2 2025
Ukraine FacilityPublish the pipeline of investment projects for extraction of critical raw materialsQ2 2025
Ukraine FacilityPublish report on the verification of Critical Raw Materials reserves of UkraineQ3 2025
Ukraine FacilityPublish a study assessing the current legislation on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting in the mining and extractive sector with recommendations on what legislative gaps need to be closedQ4 2025

Tax system: closing loopholes and raising tax revenues

In this last section we consider the planned changes to the taxation system that would enable the government to collect more taxes to finance defense and other needs. These changes are described by the government’s Revenue Strategy, to which both Ukraine Facility Plan and the IMF program refer.

The IMF program is mainly focused on reduction of tax evasion and leveling the playing field. Within this program the government promised to refrain from tax amnesties or introduction of new tax exemptions during the program duration (some tax exemptions on critical imports are possible but should be limited in time and tightly overseen, and by 2026 the system of privileges on customs payments should be harmonized with the EU rules). Both the IMF program and the EU-2023 Review mention the need to implement the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. Ukraine will develop a unified approach to provision of tax privileges and introduce constant monitoring of the sum of these privileges and their effectiveness.

One of the most important loopholes in the taxation system is the simplified tax regime that allows large companies to “optimize” tax payments by hiring their staff as private entrepreneurs. This way an employee pays only 5% of income tax plus social contribution equal to 22% of minimum salary, which is much lower than 18% of income tax + 1.5% of military surcharge + social contribution equal to 22% of the actual salary. The Revenue Strategy assumes that when deductibles are similar, people will demand official employment because in this case they will not need to administer their taxes. Those who stay on the simplified system will have to use cash registers and will have to pay VAT after they reach a certain revenue threshold. The Revenue Strategy does not specify planned tax rates for entrepreneurs working on the simplified system. It only states that these rates will be differentiated by types of activities and by the sum of revenues.

Progressive scale will be introduced (again) for a “regular” personal income tax. Historically, Ukraine had both flat and progressive scales and it is hard to tell which one was more efficient. The minimum non-taxable income will be replaced by subsidies to the poorest.

All these changes will happen a year after the tax inspection introduces a proper personal data protection system and gains access to bank accounts of people, i.e. the earliest in 2027. The government may need to collect more taxes already in 2024-2025 because of insufficient external economic support. The government may raise the VAT rate or speed up aligning of excise rates with the EU.

Legal entities that use simplified taxation systems will pay the rate equal to the regular profit tax rate – 18% compared to current 6% of turnover + VAT or 10% without VAT. Profit tax privileges and exemptions will be limited so that effective tax rate does not fall below 15%. However, to encourage investment, the government plans to implement instant amortization (i.e. spending on some productive assets will be deductible from the profit tax base in the same year when it is made). 

Until 2027 the government will implement the rules that discourage companies from searching for low-tax jurisdictions (BEPS and OECD two-pillar solution). By 2025 it plans to align the Ukrainian taxation system with international rules and by 2030 – to review all the agreements on avoiding dual taxation and if needed adjust Ukrainian legislation to international norms. 

As we noted in the first article, local governments will receive more powers and opportunities to collect property tax. This tax should become the major revenue source for local budgets, in line with the experience of other countries. 

By the end of 2025, Ukraine will introduce taxation of virtual assets and a new carbon tax model (see table 3).

Table 9. Documents and other indicators of tax reforms

origin of recommendationdocuments to be adopted or amended and other indicatorsdeadline
IMFAssess the effectiveness of tax privileges, their effect on the budgetQ2 2024
EU-2023, IMFDevelop the draft law in line with EU Anti-Tax Avoidance directive to prevent tax evasion2024
IMF, Revenue StrategyAnalyze and reform rent payments: all payments for radio frequencies will be the same, there will be a legislative limit on the time during which a well can be considered new (those wells pay lower rent)2024
EU-2023Ensure the implementation of the automatic exchange of tax information with EU Member States in line with the OECD Global Standards and Ukrainian law. Establish central communication office for information exchange with EU Member States and connections to EU IT systems2024
Revenue StrategyAdopt the draft law introducing OECD principles of transfer pricing2024
Revenue StrategyPublish a study on pros and cons of windfall taxes modeling impact of such taxes on Ukraine’s investment attractiveness 2024
Revenue StrategyPIT: exemptions/privileges cut but instant amortization introduced2024-2025
Revenue StrategyImplementation of e-Excise system: sub-laws and IT solution2024-2025
Revenue StrategyHarmonize Ukrainian law with the EU system of custom duty privileges. The new Customs Code should align with the EU Customs Code and additional regulations 2015/24462015/24472022/23991186/2009608/2013.2024-26
EU-2023, Revenue strategyAlign VAT legislation with the EU directive2025-2027
Revenue StrategyImplement the EU directives on headquarters and branches;  shares and royalties 2026
Revenue StrategyReform Personal Income Tax and simplified taxation system2027
Revenue StrategyIntroduce the excise on sugar drinks 2027
Revenue StrategySet minimum excise rates on alcohol at the EU level2028
Revenue StrategyGradually align tobacco taxes with the EU2029
Revenue StrategySet minimum excise rates on fuel at the EU level2029

Conclusion

In some areas (energy sector, education and science, taxation or social support) Ukraine will need major institutional reforms. In some sectors (e.g. agriculture or transport) no major changes are planned but a lot of investment is needed (demining, reconstruction of transport infrastructure etc).

Implementation of the planned reforms will show Ukraine’s commitment to join the EU and will also benefit Ukrainian businesses and public finance. The Ukraine Facility Plan will provide some “seed” investment, e.g. into reconstruction of schools, hospitals or energy efficiency. If institutional reforms are properly implemented, this investment will attract some private players or international organizations. However, this will happen only if Ukraine receives enough military support to be able to defeat Russia. 

Source: https://voxukraine.org/en/sectoral-reforms-human-capital-and-tax-policies-what-to-expect-in-the-next-four-years

A commentary on potential reparations claims arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict

During Paris Arbitration Week, HKA hosted a panel that considered the options for compensation for damages loss or injury open to victims of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The panel was timely as the Register for Damage for Ukraine (“the Register” or “RD4U”) was on the point of opening (and now has opened) for the receipt of certain claims.  The Register which sits in the Hague was established within the framework of the Council of Europe (and with support of others including the USA and Canada) to provide a structure for recording claims for compensation arising from the invasion.  The Register is precisely that: a register to provide a permanent record of the loss and injury suffered.  Its mandate does not extend to assessing the validity or value of claims or order any compensation payments. 

This will therefore necessarily be part of a wider compensation mechanism the form of which has yet to be decided – although one could contemplate some form of compensation commission and fund perhaps not dissimilar to the United Nations Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) process following the First Gulf War.  Under that process, 6 categories of claim were established labelled A (individual harm) to F (government).  Claims were submitted to the UNCC in Geneva and assessed by them with payments made from a fund established using a percentage of Iraq’s oil revenues, The UNCC’s work was substantially concluded by 2005 – some 14 years after the war- with awards totalling over $52bn to over 1.5million successful claimants.  This was of course only possible with the agreement of Iraq to the funding process.

The UNCC process was also a paper heavy exercise.  Thanks in part to changes in technology, the Register will record claims solely in digital form.  There will also be a direct interface between the register and the Ukrainian mobile application “Diia”.  To date the Register is open for one category of claim: Category A3.1 – Damage or destruction of residential immovable property.  To date over 1000 claims have already been registered.

In addition, understanding the role and scope of the Register the panel also discussed the other options through which potential claimants could seek compensation.  It was noted that Russia is party to more than 60 bilateral investment treaties which remain in force.  Clearly these provide protections through the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment and from unlawful expropriation.  Discussion of these other options is beyond the scope of this article, other than to note that a number of claims have been filed both in relation to the full invasion in 2022 but also in relation to the earlier occupation and annexation of the Crimea. Many of these latter claims are well advanced – and have found in favour of the claimants – although Russia failed to participate in them for much of the past several years.  Naturally the ability to enforce any successful claims was a topic of interest (and uncertainty).

HKA contributed to the panel by undertaking a top down assessment of the economic impact of the conflict on the Ukrainian economy.  To do this, requires an understanding of the evolution of Ukrainian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but for the conflict. Given that this counterfactual scenario cannot be observed, it has to be estimated.

The synthetic control method is used extensively in economic literature to assess the causal impact of events and policy interventions. In the past, synthetic controls have been used to estimate the impact of German unification in 1990 on the German economy, and the impact on the UK economy of leaving the EU.

The synthetic control method uses data on a group of comparator countries to construct a counterfactual Ukraine GDP that evolves in a similar manner to Ukraine GDP prior to the conflict. Information on these comparator countries is then used to estimate GDP for Ukraine in absence of the conflict. The set of comparator countries we used were Eastern European countries other than post-Soviet states. Information on inflation, trade activity, and the proportion of children in secondary education is also used to improve the predictive accuracy of the estimated counterfactual. Looking backwards, the model maps Ukrainian GDP before 2014 to within 5% of the actual outturn.

Figure 1 below shows the results of the analysis both before and after 2014. The figure shows Ukrainian GDP from 2003 to 2022 and counterfactual Ukraine (labelled Synthetic Ukraine) from the same period. The decline of the Ukrainian GDP in 2014 coincides with the annexation of Crimea and the war between pro-Russian separatists and Ukraine in the Donbas region of Ukraine in the same year. The model also demonstrates that but for the annexation and subsequent invasion the Ukrainian economy will have continued to grow broadly in line with economies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 1: Ukrainian GDP in absence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Notes: The series labelled ‘Synthetic Ukraine’ is an estimate of the counterfactual Ukrainian GDP in absence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This estimate is obtained using the synthetic control method. The vertical line indicates the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014.
Source: HKA calculations

The results show that from 2014 to 2022, Ukraine lost $1.46 trillion in GDP as a result of the conflict.  In 2022, itself (the year Russia invaded) the results show a loss of $323 billion. In 2023, the results show a loss of $116 billion.  That lost output is lower in 2023 reflects slower growth, and, in some cases, a contraction in economic activity across comparator European countries.

Conclusion

As of today, the war shows little sign of ending.  Critical questions of course remain as to how any reparations process might develop.  These include the scope of claims, the measurement of damage inflicted and how compensation is to be sourced and paid. 

However, the Register now exists with a Board and operational secretariat – and claims are beginning to be recorded.  ISDS claims are also advancing.  Claims are of course developed on an accounting based approach based on lost profits of individual companies and individuals, i.e. a “bottom up” approach. 

In contrast, the analysis presented above assesses the total of lost economic activity and not just lost assets and profits. The reconciliation of these two approaches appears to be central to the quantum of any post war restitution damages.   However, it is perhaps instructive that through our analysis we estimate that to date, lost economic activity is already in the order of $1.57 trillion.  Evidently, this is increasing daily. 

Source: https://www.hka.com/a-commentary-on-potential-reparations-claims-arising-from-russia-ukraine-conflict/

Post-release: EBA Odesa Business Talks: Recovery Ukraine. Recovery projects in the South of Ukraine

On 23 May, the Southern Ukrainian Office of the European Business Association in partnership with Interlegal held a Business Talk on an urgent and extremely important for the Ukrainian business community topic – “Recovery Ukraine. Reconstruction projects in the South of Ukraine”.  

The panel of speakers included CEOs of leading agricultural and logistics companies from the southern region of Ukraine, representatives of international corporations, legal and consulting firms and the government sector. 

Our friends and colleagues share their experiences of finding opportunities for development and growth in the third year of a full-scale war. Ambitious government investment and reconstruction projects, flexibility and adaptation to changing conditions, the restoration of production capacity and remarkable cases of companies that have managed to rise from the ashes in the face of daily challenges and total losses remind us that progress and success are possible even in the face of the worst crisis. 

Despite the ever-present war risks, business in the Southern Region, as the whole Ukraine, has no intention of giving up or wasting a single day for reflection. Here and now, Ukraine’s largest companies are working to rebuild and modernize.  The key goal is to create a new, prosperous, modern economy in a new, modern country. An economy where every business can work and feel free and secure.  

We would like to thank everyone who took the time and opportunity to attend our event and share their unique experiences. We’re sure that the stories presented at Business Talk will inspire many in Ukraine and beyond. 

We look forward to the next opportunity to meet you. Follow Interlegal on social media to stay in touch! 

Mykolaiv, the Danish Model for Rebuilding Ukraine – Without Corruption

Ukraine needs as much outside help as it can get to build back after Russia’s attempt to destroy it. Denmark is helping pave the way and showing others how it might be done efficiently.

Ukrainian rescuers hose down a destroyed residential building as they move rubble after a missile strike in Mykolaiv on July 20, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The reconstruction plan for the city of Mykolaiv, Ukraine’s ninth largest, could become an anti-corruption model for all other Ukrainian cities as the Municipality of Mykolaiv partners with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and Denmark.

Taras Byk, board member of the Agency for Recovery and Development, and foreign businessmen from Odesa discussed rebuilding Mykolaiv at a meeting on March 14.

The city, which in Soviet times had the largest military shipyards on the Black Sea, was massively attacked by Russian troops in the first months of the war in 2022, due to its strategic bridge over the Bug River, the large natural barrier that blocks the road to Odesa. It was an obligatory passage for the Russians to conquer the rich ports of Ukraine.

As such, the city was hit continually, until the end of March 2022, by missiles and artillery shells. Even today it is attacked regularly with missiles and drones, like Odesa. Half of its 500,000 inhabitants have abandoned their homes.

In the summer of 2022, the mayor of Mykolaiv, Oleksandr Sienkevych, publicly asked for the UN’s help in developing a forward-looking master plan to rebuild his city, centered on people and the future.

The UNECE agency in Geneva mobilized the international architecture firm One Work in Milan to create the reconstruction master plan, according to the principle of build back better – that is, not redoing the city as it was before the destruction, but improving it. On the basis of the guidelines thus developed, UNECE will offer international tenders for the various works to be carried out.

A few months earlier, in July 2022, at the first international conference for the reconstruction of Ukraine, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal had presented a map with the assignment of Ukrainian cities and regions to various Western countries in Lugano. A sort of international piecemeal adoption of Ukraine, to concentrate foreign investments according to nationality.

This approach was then completely abandoned, with the sole exception of Denmark, which confirmed that it wanted to concentrate the work of Danish companies on Mykolaiv. Denmark has decided to play this important role also due to the country’s maritime tradition. In effect, it would allow Denmark to facilitate a special relationship with a Black Sea port for its operations.

Sienkevych said in a television interview that Ukrainians see Denmark as a perfect partner for cooperation. “We see Mykolaiv as ‘the new Copenhagen’ of the future,” he said. But the Mayor also made a provocative statement for some Ukrainian administrators: “We don’t need money, we need projects.”

He basically asked not to offer funds to his own administration, but to pay companies directly at their offices outside Ukraine, to neutralize the risk of corruption – a working method that could be copied by other cities in Ukraine.

Taras Byk, with his Recovery and Development Agency, manages this strategic collaboration with Denmark. His task is to assess the city’s needs and communicate them to his Danish interlocutors so they can identify which companies can carry out the projects.

“It’s not a system where Denmark just hands over the money and then decides what to do with it. We have to create the projects first and then find the financing,” Byk said.

Among the key sectors that Danish companies will have to deal with is the waste collection and disposal/recycling system, which is lacking throughout Ukraine. Greenery will also be a central theme of the reconstruction, Byk explained. “We see the development of Mykolaiv as a green city, so Denmark’s experiences will be significant.”

But the most pressing problem is that many buildings in the city no longer have water or heating. Today the inhabitants have to collect water in bottles distributed by public service vehicles. Also, in this field Danish companies can help with the reconstruction of the urban water system destroyed by the Russians and a modern water purification plant.

Of course, where Danish companies need subcontractors to carry out work on site more economically, there will also be work for Ukrainian companies, Byk added in his presentation.

The presentation of the Damage and Key Needs Assessment Report of Mykolaiv took place in Kyiv on Dec. 16, 2022. The study was conducted by the KSE Institute with the support of the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI).

According to an EUACI estimate, the reconstruction of Mykolaiv is expected to cost at least €852 million.

Denmark initially allocated 100 million DKK ($14.6 million) for the reconstruction of the city. And according to Danish Development Minister Flemming Møller Mortensen, this amount will increase.

Source: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/29917

RESEARCH: IMPACT OF THE WAR ON THE GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

For two years now, Russia has been systematically destroying the Ukrainian agricultural sector, threatening global food security.

In research prepared for the International Centre for Ukrainian Victory, experts examined the loss of fertile land, explosive contamination, damage from the explosion of the Kakhovka Dam, loss of agricultural infrastructure, and damage from the militarisation of the Black Sea. They also analysed the prospects for the recovery of the Ukrainian agricultural sector and the need to protect infrastructure, ports, and trade routes from enemy attacks.

Key findings:

  • Ukraine’s agricultural sector has suffered more than $80 billion of direct losses and damage as a result of the full-scale invasion.
  • The areas directly affected by the hostilities accounted for about 36% of pre-war grain production.
  • 1/3 of agricultural companies left the market. Another 10-20% may leave in 2023/24 MY, given the current working conditions. About 2,653 agricultural enterprises suffered losses. Over 90% of small farmers suffer losses.
  • The area of temporarily occupied agricultural land in Ukraine reaches 8.0 million hectares (6.2 million hectares excluding Crimea).
  • Russia’s destruction of the Kakhovka dam caused Ukraine losses worth almost $14 billion. 90% of the irrigation canals have dried up. 
  • Water supply to 31 irrigation systems in Dnipro, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions was stopped. In 2021, they provided irrigation for 584,000 hectares, from which they harvested about 4 million tons of grain and oil crops worth $1.5 billion.
  • 174 thousand km2 of Ukraine’s territory (almost 30%) was assessed as potentially contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war. This is the total area of such countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Denmark.
  • The production of major crops in 2024 could reach 79.8 million tons, which is only 900 thousand tons less than in 2023. But this is a significantly lower production rate compared to the period before the full-scale invasion (season 2021-2022).

Attachment RESEARCH: IMPACT OF THE WAR ON THE GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

Source: https://ukrainianvictory.org/publications/research-impact-of-the-war-on-the-global-food-security/

Estonia is the first country in the world which adopted a law on the use of frozen Russian assets in favor of Ukraine

The Estonian Parliament (the Riigikogu) adopted a law that allows using the frozen assets of Russian natural persons in order to reimburse losses caused to Ukraine by the war. 65 members of the Riigikogu voted in favour, while three members voted against, as reported on the website of the Estonian parliament.

Creation of a legal framework for use of the frozen assets – this is a complex task; a number of allied countries and international organizations are working thereon, while Estonia is playing a pioneering role here.

As reported, “Russia is an aggressor country; therefore, reimbursement of losses caused by hostilities cannot fall on the shoulders of Ukraine and its allies. Russia is responsible for causing damages, as well as shall bear this responsibility”.

In order to commence proceedings in Estonia for the use of property, Ukraine shall submit a corresponding request. Previously, Hanno Pevkur, the Minister of Defense of Estonia, announced that the idea of sending Western military personnel to Ukraine received no development either at the country level or at the EU level.

Source: https://news.pn/uk/politics/309034

Defense and restoration of Ukraine: the EU reached an agreement on use of Russian assets

The European Union managed to reach a consensus regarding frozen Russian assets.

Funds will be remitted for the purpose of defense and restoration of Ukraine which suffered from the Russian hostilities and regular shelling, as reported by L’Echo with reference to notes by Valérie Ubren, CEO of the Belgian depository.

She highlighted that a decision on seizure of assets should be made in the next few weeks.
Mrs. Urben explained: “The amount will be in the range between 87% and 89% of all after-tax income from Russian assets”.

Seizure of Russian assets: what is the difficulty?
Valérie Ubren noted that seizure of Russian assets frozen in European banks could strike the financial markets.

In addition, the Belgian depository is proceeding over 100 lawsuits in Russian courts against Russian investors who demand to return funds blocked due to sanctions.

Frozen Russian assets
Nearly 70% of all Russian Federation assets frozen in the West after the full-scale invasion into Ukraine are kept in the Central Belgian Securities Depository Euroclear. Their cost is equal to various securities and funds of the Russian central bank in the amount of €190 billion.

Source: https://fakty.com.ua/ua/svit/20240508-oborona-ta-vidnovlennya-ukrayini-u-yes-dijshli-zgodi-pro-vikoristannya-aktiviv-rf/

THE NATIONAL BANK OF UKRAINE HAS EASED FOREIGN CURRENCY RESTRICTIONS FOR BUSINESSES

In early May 2024, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) announced a new wave of foreign currency liberalization measures, the most extensive since the commencement of full-scale invasion on 24 February 2024. The new package of amendments, introduced by the NBU Resolution No.56 dated 3 May 2024 (Resolution No.56), which entered into force on 4 May 2024, provides for the following liberalization measures.

1. PERMISSION FOR PARTIAL SERVICING OF LOANS OBTAINED BEFORE 20 JUNE 2023

Easing of restrictions on servicing “old” external loans obtained before 20 August 2023 is one of the most expected measures from the NBU. Pursuant to Resolution No.56, Ukrainian borrowers are now allowed to pay interest on the above-mentioned loans subject to the following conditions:

  • For the purpose of paying interest payments that were overdue as of 01 May 2024, under a single loan agreement, the transfer of funds may be made in an amount not exceeding EUR 1,000,000 (or the equivalent of this amount in another foreign currency) per calendar quarter (this limit will not apply to scheduled interest payments falling due after 30 April 2024)
  • The debt under the relevant loan agreement must not have been overdue as of 24 February 2022
  • The funds for such interest payments were not sourced from loans obtained from residents of Ukraine
  • The early repayment of interest is not permitted, as well as the postponement of maturity dates for outstanding interest payments to dates after 24 February 2022

The above-mentioned easing measures are aimed at minimizing the risk of defaults among Ukrainian borrowers and improving the environment for attracting new capital.

2. SIMPLIFIED CONDITIONS FOR REPAYMENT OF LOANS OBTAINED AFTER 20 JUNE 2023

The NBU has lifted some restrictions on the ability to purchase foreign currency funds for servicing loans from non-residents obtained after 20 June 2023. Henceforth, borrowers in Ukraine have the opportunity to freely acquire foreign currency funds for the purpose of paying interest, regardless of the term of use of such external loan. Regarding the principal amount, the requirement to repay it solely from their own foreign currency reserves applies only to short-term loans with a term of use not exceeding one year.

3. LIFTING RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORT OPERATIONS

Resolution No.56 enables the free purchase and transfer of foreign currency funds for the purpose of paying for imports of any goods, works, services, etc. Prior to these amendments, residents of Ukraine were only able to pay for goods included in the list approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 24 February 2022 No.153 “On Certain Issues Regarding Import”. Consequently, the respective resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is anticipated to be annulled in this regard.

4. PERMISSION TO REPATRIATE DIVIDENDS

Since the commencement of the full-scale invasion, foreign investors have been unable to repatriate dividends earned in Ukraine on corporate rights of Ukrainian companies to their foreign bank accounts. However, the NBU has now allowed the transfer of funds abroad for the purpose of disbursing dividends based on operational results from 1 January 2024. This relaxation does not extend to the distribution of profits accumulated in prior periods and/or reserve capital.

In addition, the repatriation of dividends is possible only under the following conditions:

  • The transfer of foreign currency for the payment of dividends shall be made directly to the accounts of foreign investors abroad, including through the Depository System of Ukraine
  • During a calendar month, the amount of repatriated dividends cannot exceed EUR 1,000,000 (or the equivalent of this amount in another foreign currency)

This easing will come into effect on 13 May 2024.

5. LIFTING RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDS TRANSFERS FOR LEASING/RENT

Resolution No.56 enables legal entities and individual entrepreneurs to transfer funds abroad to make payments under leasing/rent agreements without any additional restrictions regarding the subject and the execution date. Prior to these amendments cross-border transfers were permitted solely for the purpose of paying for the leasing/rent of vehicles.

6. PERMISSION TO TRANSFER FUNDS TO THE PARENT COMPANIES

The NBU has allowed representative offices of foreign airlines and international payment systems to make transfers in favor of their parent companies in an amount not exceeding the equivalent of EUR 5,000,000 during a calendar month.

Thus, the package of easing measures introduced by the NBU is a signal indicating positive trends in the financial system of Ukraine. These amendments aim to enhance the business environment and attract foreign capital to the Ukrainian economy. However, a significant number of the currency restrictions still continues to be in force, and therefore, foreign currency transactions will continue to undergo meticulous scrutiny to ensure alignment with prevailing regulations.

Source:https://www.asterslaw.com/press_center/legal_alerts/the_national_bank_of_ukraine_has_eased_foreign_currency_restrictions_for_businesses/

Shmyhal announced the cancellation of restrictions on the import of business services being valid since the outbreak of the war

The Cabinet of Ministers canceled the resolution on restrictions of import of business services. Previously, the National Bank of Ukraine adopted a similar decision, as announced by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal during the government meeting.

He said: “We are canceling Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 153 which limited payments for the import of goods and services. This is very important for business”.

He also noted that such liberalization will open up new opportunities for Ukrainian entrepreneurs, namely to enter new markets and to strengthen Ukrainian exports.

Shmyhal declared that such decision of the government is included in the broader policy of deregulation being currently carried out.

He added: “Over a thousand permits, licenses, and certificates governing interaction of the state and business have been reviewed. Some will be completely canceled, some will be simplified, some will be digitized”. Previously, the NBU mitigated currency restrictions for business entities making payments abroad.

Source: https://news.pn/uk/politics/308612

The Government Approves the Procedure for Using Funds to Support Investment Projects with Significant Investments

The Procedure for Using Funds from the State Budget to provide State Support for the Implementation of Investment Projects involving Significant Investments was adopted at the session of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 26 April 2024.

Conditions for receiving State Support

The total amount of state support can be up to 30% of the investment. Such support is available to investors planning to implement a project in Ukraine with an investment volume of at least EUR 12 million and a duration of up to 5 years in the following sectors: processing industry, extraction for further processing and/or enrichment of minerals, transport and logistics, education, scientific activities, healthcare, waste management, arts, culture, tourism, sports, and electronic communications.

Investors may receive several types of state support, subject to the above requirements, including:

  • Preemptive rights to use state-owned or municipally owned land plots;
  • Compensation for the costs of constructing engineering and transport infrastructure facilities, as well as costs associated with connecting to engineering and transport networks;
  • Tax benefits;
  • Duty-free importation of necessary equipment;
  • Exemptions from compensation for forestry production losses.

Projects must involve the development, renovation, technical or technological upgrading of the relevant investment objects, as well as the creation of new jobs. The investor must ensure the creation of at least:

  • 10 new jobs with salaries at least 50% higher than the average salary in the region for the same type of activity;
  • Or 30 new jobs with salaries at least 30% higher than the average salary in the region for the same type of activity;
  • Or 50 new jobs with salaries at least 15% higher than the average salary in the region for the same type of activity.

The state budget has earmarked UAH 3 billion this year to support such investment projects.

Control over Investors’ Activities

The government will monitor investors’ compliance with the terms of the agreement. If the Ministry of Economy finds that the amount of funds invested is less than EUR 12 million, the investor must return the entire amount of state support received to a special account of the Ministry within one month.

If state financial control authorities establish that an investor has illegally received compensation or partial compensation, the investor must also return the entire amount of compensation received within one month.

Source: https://www.integrites.com/publications/procedure-for-using-funds-to-support-significant-investments/